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Abstract 
This study investigates the effects of short-term employment contracts on employment fluctuations 
and economic fluctuations using a dynamic model with long-term and short-term employment 
contracts. Numerical experiments show that an increase in the short-term employment ratio amplifies 
the fluctuations in total employment—when an expected temporary productivity shock occurs—
because of the variations in short-term employment being larger than those in long-term employment. 
Moreover, the large fluctuations in employment lead to the high variations in production and 
consumption. Promoting the utilization of short-term employment contracts would elicit the 
amplification of not only the employment fluctuations but also the economic fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
Fluctuations in employment have been investigated in various fields and contexts, including labor 
market institutions. In labor market analysis, some empirical studies examine the relationship between 
the employment volatility and short-term employment contracts such as fixed-term contracts and 
temporary agency work. de Serres and Murtin (2013), using data of OECD countries, indicate that the 
large fluctuations in unemployment are caused by an increase in the share of temporary workers. 
OECD (2017) indicates that the response of unemployment rates to aggregate demand shocks is 
augmented under a high incidence of temporary work. This study investigates the effects of short-term 
employment contracts on employment volatility and economic fluctuations using numerical 
experiments. 
 In theoretical analysis with heterogeneous labor contracts, some differences between contracts 
are, for example, stickiness of employment adjustments, employment duration, and types of jobs and 
skills. Caggese and Cuñat (2008), Cahuc et al. (2016) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) assume a 
permanent contract and a temporary contract in their analyses; the permanent contract has an indefinite 
duration and an adjustment cost associated with firing, while the temporary contract has a fixed 
duration and no adjustment costs. Smith (2007) classifies permanent and temporary jobs according to 
whether a contract period exists. Macho-Stadler et al. (2014) analyze the firms' optimization of long-
term and short-term employment contracts; the long-term contract lasts for two periods (junior and 
senior) and the short-term contract for one period (junior or senior). In the dynamic labor demand 
literature, Matsue (2019) creates a model with a long-term and a short-term employment contract, 
which supposes that both contracts have a predetermined duration; firms incur adjustment costs only 
for hiring long-term employees, but no costs are incurred for hiring short-term employees.1 It shows 
that an increase in the short-term employment ratio leads to an increase in employment fluctuations 
because of the high variations in short-term employment that are caused by the assumption of 
adjustment costs for hiring. 
 This study provides a dynamic framework with a long-term and a short-term employment 
contract. The differences between the contracts are the duration of employment periods and the wage 
determination. The analysis incorporates not only decisions on the demand side of labor but also on 
the supply side of labor, whereas Matsue (2019) provides the dynamic labor demand model. Numerical 
experiments indicate that the fluctuations in short-term employment are larger than those of long-term 
employment when an expected productivity shock takes place. These results can be explained by the 
                                                        
1 The model with a fixed duration of employment is also discussed in Matsue (2018), which shows the properties of 
employment fluctuations under a fixed-term contract compared to the case with a permanent contract. 
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assumption of short-term contracts that stipulates the same wage level until the date of termination. 
Therefore, an increase in the short-term employment ratio brings about an increase in the variations 
of total employment, which is consistent with de Serres and Murtin (2013) and OECD (2017). 
Moreover, the model shows that large employment fluctuations cause large variations in production 
and consumption. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic model with 
long-term and short-term contracts. Section 3 provides the numerical experiments of the model. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Model 
Suppose that the economy consists of firms and households. The firms combine long-term 
employment 𝐿"#  and short-term employment 𝐿"$  to produce 𝑌" , according to a Cobb-Douglas 
production function 𝑌" = 𝐴"(𝐿"# )*(𝐿"$)-.* , where 0 < 𝛼 < 1  and 𝐴" > 0  is an exogenous 
productivity parameter. Suppose that the duration of the long-term contract is four periods and that of 
the short-term contract is two periods. Then, the long-term employment in period 𝑡 is the sum of the 
long-term new hiring ℎ6# in the periods 𝑡, 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2, and 𝑡 − 3, who do not quit: 
  𝐿"# = ℎ"# + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ".-# + (1 − 𝛿)<ℎ".<# + (1 − 𝛿)=ℎ".=# ,     (1) 
where 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1 is the voluntary quit rate of the long-term contract. The short-term employment in 
period 𝑡 is the sum of the short-term new hiring ℎ6$ in the periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1, who do not quit: 
  𝐿"$ = ℎ"$ + (1− 𝜎)ℎ".-$ ,            (2) 
where 0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 1 is the voluntary quit rate of the short-term contract. It is assumed that the short-
term wage is fixed during the contract period. Cahuc et al. (2016) also assume that firms pay workers 
a fixed wage prescribed in the contract for its duration. If all the long-term and short-term employees 
quit at the end of the first period in which they are hired (𝛿 = 𝜎 = 1), then no difference exists between 
the two types of contracts. 
 The objective function of the firm is as follows: 
  𝑉 = ∑ 𝛽"C"DE F𝐴"(𝐿"# )*(𝐿"$)-.* − 𝑤"#𝐿"# − 𝑤"$ℎ"$ − 𝑤".-$ (1 − 𝜎)ℎ".-$ H, 
where 𝑤"# is the wage under the long-term contract and 𝑤"$ is the wage under the short-term contract.  
The firm chooses ℎ"#  and ℎ"$  to maximize 𝑉  subject to (1) and (2), where ℎ.=# , ℎ.<# ,	ℎ.-# , ℎE# , 
ℎC.<# , ℎC.-# , ℎC# , and ℎCJ-#  are given, that is, 𝐿E#  and 𝐿CJ-#  are given; ℎ.-$ , ℎE$, ℎC$ , and ℎCJ-$  are 
given, that is, 𝐿E$  and 𝐿CJ-$  are given. The first-order conditions for long-term employment are as 
follows: 
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  ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝛿)6."𝛼𝐴6 KLM
NJ(-.O)LMPQN J(-.O)RLMPRN J(-.O)SLMPSN
LMTJ(-.U)LMPQT
V
*.-
"J=6D"  
  = ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝛿)6.""J=6D" 𝑤6# , 𝑡 = 1, 2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 3.        (3) 
Meanwhile, the first-order conditions for short-term employment are as follows: 
  ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝜎)6."(1 − 𝛼)𝐴6 KLM
NJ(-.O)LMPQN J(-.O)RLMPRN J(-.O)SLMPSN
LMTJ(-.U)LMPQT
V
*
"J-6D"  
  = ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝜎)6.""J-6D" 𝑤"$ , 𝑡 = 1, 2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 1.        (4) 
(3) and (4) indicate that the marginal product of labor equals to the marginal cost of labor. 
 The households have the following preference: 
  𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽" K𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶" − 𝑎 (ab
N )Qcd
-Je − 𝑏
{LbTJ(-.U)LbPQT }Qci
-Jj VC"DE , 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, 𝛾 > 0 and 𝜇 > 0 are the labor supply parameters, 𝑎 > 0 
and 𝑏 > 0  are the scaling factors, 𝐶"  is the consumption. A similar type of utility function is 
assumed, for example, in Galí et al. (2007) and Garín et al. (2019). The budget constraint is as follows: 
  𝐶" = 𝑤"#𝐿"# + 𝑤"$ℎ"$ +𝑤".-$ (1 − 𝜎)ℎ".-$  
The households choose 𝐶" , 𝐿"# , and ℎ"$ to maximize 𝑈 subject to the budget constraint, where ℎ.=# , 
ℎ.<# ,	ℎ.-# , ℎE# , ℎC.<# , ℎC.-# , ℎC# , and ℎCJ-#  are given, that is, 𝐿E#  and 𝐿CJ-#  are given; ℎ.-$ , ℎE$, ℎC$ , 
and ℎCJ-$  are given, that is, 𝐿E$  and 𝐿CJ-$  are given. From the optimization problem, the following 
labor supply equations are obtained: 
  𝑎(𝐿"# )e = mb
N
nb , 𝑡 = 1, 2,⋯ , 𝑇.            (5) 
  ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝜎)6."𝑏[ℎ6$ + (1 − 𝜎)ℎ6.-$ ]j"J-6D"  
  = ∑ 𝛽6(1 − 𝜎)6.""J-6D" mb
T
nM , 𝑡 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑇 − 1.        (6) 
 The goods market clearing condition is given by the following: 
  𝑌" = 𝐶" , 𝑡 = 1, 2,⋯ , 𝑇.            (7) 
 From (1)–(7) and the production function, (𝑤-# ,𝑤<# ,⋯ ,𝑤C# ) , (𝑤-$ , 𝑤<$ ,⋯ , 𝑤C.-$ ) , 
(ℎ-# , ℎ<# ,⋯ , ℎC.=# ) , (𝐿-# , 𝐿<# , ⋯ , 𝐿C# ) , (ℎ-$ , ℎ<$ ,⋯ , ℎC.-$ ) , (𝐿-$ , 𝐿<$ ,⋯ , 𝐿C$ ) , (𝑌-, 𝑌<,⋯ , 𝑌C) , and 
(𝐶- , 𝐶<, ⋯ , 𝐶C) are determined. Suppose that the labor supply parameters are equal, that is, 𝛾 = 𝜇, in 
(5) and (6). Then, the steady-state values 𝑤#, 𝑤$, ℎ#, 𝐿#, ℎ$, 𝐿$, 𝑌, and 𝐶 are determined by (1)–
(7) and the production function as follows:2 
                                                        
2 The derivations of the steady-state values (8)–(15) are shown in the appendix. 
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  𝑤# = 𝛼𝐴 q *r(-.*)st
uPQ
Qcd
            (8) 
  𝑤$ = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴 q *r(-.*)st
u
Qcd
           (9) 
  ℎ# = -v.wOJvOR.OS x
*
sy
Q
Qcd
            (10) 
  𝐿# = x*sy
Q
Qcd
              (11) 
  ℎ$ = -<.U x
-.*
r y
Q
Qcd
             (12) 
  𝐿$ = x-.*r y
Q
Qcd
              (13) 
  𝑌 = 𝐴 x*sy
u
Qcd x-.*r y
QPu
Qcd
            (14) 
  𝐶 = 𝐴x*sy
u
Qcd x-.*r y
QPu
Qcd
            (15) 
 
 
3. Numerical experiments 
In this section, the effects of changes in the short-term employment ratio on employment fluctuations 
and economic fluctuations are explored through numerical analysis. 
 
3.1. Parameters setting 
The parameter values corresponding to each short-term employment ratio are listed in Table 1. The 
scaling factor 𝑎 in the utility function is set to 1.0. The discount factor 𝛽 is set at 0.96. The labor 
supply parameters 𝛾 and 𝜇 are the same as the values used in Ateşağaoğlu and Torul (2018). The 
quit rate 𝛿 and 𝜎 are the same as the values used in Cabo and Martín-Román (2019). 
 The scaling factor in the utility function 𝑏 and the parameter in the production function 𝛼 are 
set to generate a steady-state wage ratio of short-term employment to long-term employment 𝜙 =
𝑤$ 𝑤#⁄  equals to 0.7 and a steady-state short-term employment ratio 𝜃 = 𝐿$ (𝐿# + 𝐿$)⁄  equals to 0.1, 
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%). The setting of the wage ratio is based on 
OECD (2015), which points out that temporary workers' hourly wages are equal to about 70% of 
permanent workers' median hourly wages in some OECD countries. Substituting (8) and (9) into 𝜙 =
 6 
𝑤$ 𝑤#⁄ , we obtain the following: 
  𝑏 = 𝑎𝜙-Je x *-.*y
e
             (16) 
The short-term employment ratio 𝜃 = 𝐿$ (𝐿# + 𝐿$)⁄  is transformed into 𝐿# 𝐿$⁄ = 1 𝜃⁄ − 1 . By 
substituting (11) and (13) into 𝐿# 𝐿$⁄ = 1 𝜃⁄ − 1, the following equation is obtained: 
  𝛼 = -
-J}~x

QPy
Qcd             (17) 
From (16) and (17), the parameters 𝑏 and 𝛼 are determined when the other parameters are given.  
 
 Table 1. Short-term employment ratio and parameter values 
Short-term employment ratio 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
𝑎 Parameter in utility function 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
𝑏 Parameter in utility function 13.1045 4.44472 2.16638 1.20195 0.7 
𝛼 Parameter in production function 0.927835 0.851064 0.769231 0.681818 0.588235 
𝛽 Discount factor 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
𝛾 Long-term labor supply parameter 4/3 4/3 4/3 4/3 4/3 
𝜇 Short-term labor supply parameter 4/3 4/3 4/3 4/3 4/3 
𝛿 Voluntary quit rate in long-term 
contracts 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
𝜎 Voluntary quit rate in short-term 
contracts 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 
 
3.2. Effects of an increase in the short-term employment ratio 
Consider the effects of an increase in the short-term employment ratio on employment volatility and 
economic fluctuations. It is assumed that planning period 𝑇 = 10. The economy is in a steady-state 
at the beginning of the planning period and in the period 𝑇 + 1: ℎ.=# = ℎ.<# =	ℎ.-# = ℎE# = ℎ# =
ℎ# = ℎ-E# = ℎ--# = ℎ#, that is, 𝐿E# = 𝐿--# = 𝐿#; ℎ.-$ = ℎE$ = ℎ-E$ = ℎ--$ = ℎ$, that is, 𝐿E$ = 𝐿--$ = 𝐿$. 
The productivity parameter in the steady-state is set at 1.0. 
 The steady-state values corresponding to each short-term employment ratio are shown in Table 
2. The increase in the steady-state short-term employment ratio is brought about by a decrease in long-
term employment and an increase in short-term employment. Total employment is defined as the sum 
of long-term employment and short-term employment 𝐿"# + 𝐿"$. 
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     Table 2. Short-term employment ratio and steady-state values 
Short-term employment ratio 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Long-term new hiring 0.303898 0.292855 0.280438 0.266308 0.24998 
Long-term employment 0.968409 0.933219 0.893649 0.848624 0.796592 
Short-term new hiring 0.0581627 0.126111 0.207023 0.30581 0.430591 
Short-term employment 0.107601 0.233305 0.382993 0.565749 0.796592 
Total employment 1.07601 1.16652 1.27664 1.41437 1.59318 
Long-term employment wage 0.791786 0.692299 0.632614 0.599293 0.588235 
Short-term new hiring wage 0.55425 0.484609 0.44283 0.419505 0.411765 
Production 0.826411 0.759128 0.734936 0.745909 0.796592 
Consumption 0.826411 0.759128 0.734936 0.745909 0.796592 
 
 
   
(a) 𝜃 = 0.1               (b) 𝜃 = 0.2                (c) 𝜃 = 0.3 
  
(d) 𝜃 = 0.4                (e) 𝜃 = 0.5 
Fig. 1 Short-term employment ratio and fluctuations in total employment 
 
 It is assumed that an expected temporary productivity shock takes place in period 1: Productivity 
increases one percent in period 1 and then returns to the initial level in period 2. The initial productivity 
level is the same as the value in the steady-state productivity, which is set to 1.0. The results of 
numerical experiments are shown in Fig. 1 and Table 3.  
 The relationship between the short-term employment ratio and the fluctuations in total 
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employment are shown in Fig. 1. The solid line shows the deviation of total employment from the 
steady-state value when a positive productivity shock occurs, and the dotted line expresses the case 
without the shock. The fluctuations in total employment are large when the short-term employment 
ratio is large. 
 
  Table 3. Short-term employment ratio and coefficient of variation 
Short-term employment ratio 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Long-term new hiring 7.24691e-08 1.49606e-07 2.31878e-07 3.19814e-07 4.14021e-07 
Long-term employment 1.32467e-08 2.73466e-08 4.23851e-08 5.8459e-08 7.56792e-08 
Short-term new hiring 2.09602e-05 2.09662e-05 2.09726e-05 2.09794e-05 2.09867e-05 
Short-term employment 5.96988e-06 5.97158e-06 5.97339e-06 5.97533e-06 5.97741e-06 
Total employment 5.97833e-07 1.19585e-06 1.79407e-06 2.39252e-06 2.99125e-06 
Long-term employment wage 0.00315955 0.00316001 0.0031605 0.00316103 0.00316159 
Short-term new hiring wage 0.00183115 0.00183142 0.00183171 0.00183202 0.00183235 
Production 0.00315955 0.00316001 0.0031605 0.00316102 0.00316158 
Consumption 0.00315955 0.00316001 0.0031605 0.00316102 0.00316158 
 
 Table 3 shows the short-term employment ratio and coefficient of variation for each variable 
corresponding to the expected temporary productivity shock. The fluctuations in short-term 
employment are larger than those of long-term employment, and thus, an increase in the short-term 
employment ratio amplifies the fluctuations in total employment. The large variations in short-term 
employment come from the short-term contract, which stipulates the same wage level during the 
contract periods. Additionally, fluctuations in production, composed of long-term and short-term 
employment, increase when the short-term employment ratio is increased due to the rise in 
employment variations. Moreover, from (7), the variations in consumption are large when the 
fluctuations in production are large. Matsue (2019) also shows, using a dynamic labor demand model, 
that an increase in the short-term employment ratio leads to an increase in employment fluctuations. 
Then, the high variations in short-term employment are caused by the assumption that firms do not 
incur the adjustment costs of short-term new hiring. 
 
 
 
 9 
4. Conclusion 
This study provides a dynamic framework with a long-term and a short-term employment contract, 
both of which have a predetermined duration. The numerical experiments with the proposed model 
show that increasing the short-term employment ratio amplifies the variations in total employment, 
which is consistent with empirical evidence. Consequently, the large fluctuations in employment bring 
about the large fluctuations in production and consumption. 
 Nevertheless, even though the model in this study focuses on short-term employment contracts, 
it could be extended to consider the effects of other aspects of the labor market, such as employment 
protection legislation and trade unions, on employment dynamics and economic fluctuations. 
Moreover, further empirical research on the parameter values in the numerical analysis should be 
undertaken. These topics are left for future research. 
 
 
Appendix. Steady-state values 
Consider the steady state 𝑤"J-# = 𝑤"# = 𝑤# , 𝑤"J-$ = 𝑤"$ = 𝑤$ , ℎ"J-# = ℎ"# = ℎ# , ℎ"J-$ = ℎ"$ = ℎ$ , 
𝑌"J- = 𝑌" = 𝑌, 𝐶"J- = 𝐶" = 𝐶 and 𝐴"J- = 𝐴" = 𝐴. Moreover, 𝛾 = 𝜇 is assumed. Then, from (1)–
(7) and the production function, the following equations are obtained: 
  𝐿# = (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#           (A1) 
  𝐿$ = (2 − 𝜎)ℎ$             (A2) 
  𝑤# = 𝛼𝐴 q(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN(<.U)LT t
*.-
           (A3) 
  𝑤$ = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴 q(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN(<.U)LT t
*
          (A4) 
  
mN
n = 𝑎(𝐿#)e               (A5) 
  
mT
n = 𝑏[(2 − 𝜎)ℎ$]e             (A6) 
  𝑌 = 𝐶               (A7) 
  𝑌 = 𝐴(𝐿#)*(𝐿$)-.*             (A8) 
 The steady-state values of 𝑤# and 𝑤$ are obtained by (A1) and (A3)–(A6). By substituting 
(A1) into (A5) to eliminate 𝐿#, we obtain the following: 
  
mN
n = 𝑎[(4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#]e          (A9) 
By substituting (A9) into (A6) to eliminate 𝐶, we obtain the following: 
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mN
mT =
s
r q
(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN
(<.U)LT t
e
           (A10) 
By substituting (A3) and (A4) into (A10) to eliminate 𝑤# and 𝑤$, we have: 
  
(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN
(<.U)LT = q
*r
(-.*)st
Q
Qcd
           (A11) 
By substituting (A11) into (A3) to eliminate (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#/(2 − 𝜎)ℎ$ , the steady-state 
value of 𝑤# is obtained: 
  𝑤# = 𝛼𝐴 q *r(-.*)st
uPQ
Qcd
            (A12) 
Moreover, by substituting (A11) into (A4) to eliminate (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#/(2 − 𝜎)ℎ$ , the 
steady-state value of 𝑤$ is obtained: 
  𝑤$ = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴 q *r(-.*)st
u
Qcd
           (A13) 
 Now, let us derive the steady-state values of ℎ#, 𝐿#, ℎ$, and 𝐿$. By substituting (A1), (A2), and 
(A7) into (A8) to eliminate 𝐿#, 𝐿$, and 𝑌, we obtain the following: 
  
n
(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN = 𝐴 q
(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN
(<.U)LT t
*.-
        (A14) 
Substituting (A11) into (A14) to eliminate (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#/(2 − 𝜎)ℎ$ , we obtain the 
following: 
  
n
(v.wOJvOR.OS)LN = 𝐴 q
*r
(-.*)st
uPQ
Qcd
          (A15) 
(A9) is transformed as follows: 
  (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ# = xmNs y
Q
Qcd q n(v.wOJvOR.OS)LNt
PQ
Qcd
      (A16) 
By substituting (A15) into (A16) to eliminate	𝐶/(4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#, we obtain the following: 
  (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ# = x-sy
Q
Qcd xmN y
Q
Qcd q *r(-.*)st
QPu
(Qcd)R
      (A17) 
By substituting (A12) into (A17) to eliminate 𝑤# 𝐴⁄ , the steady-state value of ℎ# is obtained: 
  ℎ# = -v.wOJvOR.OS x
*
sy
Q
Qcd
            (A18) 
By substituting (A18) into (A1) to eliminate (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#, the steady-state value of 𝐿# is 
obtained: 
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  𝐿# = x*sy
Q
Qcd
              (A19) 
By substituting (A18) into (A11) to eliminate (4 − 6𝛿 + 4𝛿< − 𝛿=)ℎ#, the steady-state value of ℎ$ 
is obtained: 
  ℎ$ = -<.U x
-.*
r y
Q
Qcd
             (A20) 
By substituting (A20) into (A2) to eliminate (2 − 𝛿)ℎ$, the steady-state value of 𝐿$ is obtained: 
  𝐿$ = x-.*r y
Q
Qcd
              (A21) 
 By substituting (A19) and (A21) into (A8) to eliminate 𝐿# and 𝐿$, the steady-state value of 𝑌 
is obtained: 
  𝑌 = 𝐴 x*sy
u
Qcd x-.*r y
QPu
Qcd
            (A22) 
By substituting (A22) into (A7) to eliminate 𝑌, the steady-state value of 𝐶 is obtained: 
  𝐶 = 𝐴x*sy
u
Qcd x-.*r y
QPu
Qcd
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